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Confabulation, the production of statements or actions that are unintentionally
incongruous to the subject’s history, background, present and future situation, is a
rather infrequent disorder with different aetiologies and anatomical lesions. Although
they may differ in many ways, confabulations show major similarities. Their content, with
some minor exceptions, is plausible and therefore indistinguishable from true memories,
unless one is familiar with the patient’s history, background, present and future situation.
They extend through the whole individuals’ temporality, including their past, present
and future. Accordingly, we have proposed that rather than a mere memory disorder;
confabulation reflects a distortion of Temporal Consciousness (TC), i.e., a specific form
of consciousness that allows individuals to locate objects and events according to their
subjective temporality. Another feature that confabulators share is that, regardless of
their lesion’s location, they all have a relatively preserved hippocampus (Hip), at least
unilaterally. In this article, we review data showing differences and similarities among
forms of confabulation. We then describe a model showing that the hippocampus is
crucial both for the normal functioning of TC and as the generator of confabulations, and
that different types of confabulation can be traced back to a distortion of TC resulting
from damage or disconnection of brain areas directly or indirectly connected to the
hippocampus. We conclude by comparing our model with other models of memory
and confabulation.
Keywords: memory, amnesia, confabulation, consciousness
Introduction
Confabulation is a kind of memory distortion, that, at a general level, can be defined as the
production of statements or actions that are unintentionally incongruous to the subject’s
history, background, present and future situation (Dalla Barba, 1993a; Dalla Barba et al., 1997b).
Classically described in Korsakoff’s syndrome, following lesions of the mammillary bodies and the
dorsomedial nucleus of the thalamus (TH), and often present after lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), confabulation is observed in several conditions affecting the nervous system and follows
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lesions located in more than 20 anterior and posterior brain areas
(Dalla Barba and Boissé, 2010).
Since the early description of this phenomenon, clinicians
and scientists have distinguished between different forms of
confabulation (Bonhoeffer, 1904; Berlyne, 1972; Dalla Barba,
1993a; Schnider, 2008). One of the most influential distinctions
between types of confabulation is the one proposed by Kopelman
(1987) between provoked and spontaneous confabulations. Like
other distinctions, the one proposed by Kopelman shows
advantages and limits. The advantage is that it provides
a separation between phenomena that may reflect differing
underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms. The limit is that
it fails to classify a number of confabulations that are not
appropriately captured by either of the distinction’s terms.
It has been proposed and used elsewhere a new taxonomy
of confabulation, showing that, regardless their modality of
appearance, provoked vs. spontaneous, confabulations are
plausible memories, mainly reflecting the recall of repeated
personal events mistakenly considered by the confabulating
patient as specific and unique events that occurred in a
specific and unique temporo-spatial context. This, by far the
more frequent type of confabulation, was named ‘‘Habits
Confabulation’’ (Dalla Barba and Boissé, 2010; La Corte et al.,
2010) and it was traced back to the disruption of the cognitive
mechanism that allows individuals to discriminate between
‘‘uniqueness’’, i.e., specific unique events, and ‘‘multiplicity’’, i.e.,
repeated events, habits and routines (Serra et al., 2014). In these
studies, ‘‘bizarre’’, ‘‘implausible’’, ‘‘fantastic’’ confabulations,
either spontaneous or provoked represented less than 5% of the
total number of confabulations.
Although they may differ in many ways, confabulations show
major similarities:
1. Their content, with some minor exceptions, is plausible and
therefore indistinguishable from true memories, unless one
knows the patient’s past, present and probable future situation
(Dalla Barba, 1993a).
2. They extend through the whole individuals’ temporality,
including their past, episodic memory, their orientation
in their present world and their ability to predict their
personal future (Dalla Barba et al., 1990, 1997b, 1999; Dalla
Barba, 1993a; Nedjam et al., 2000; Schnider, 2008; La Corte
et al., 2010). Accordingly, Dalla Barba (2002) proposed
that rather than a mere memory disorder, confabulation
reflects a distortion of Temporal Consciousness (TC), i.e., a
specific form of consciousness that allows individuals to have
phenomenological experience of remembering their personal
past, of being oriented in their present world and of predicting
their personal future.
3. It is uncontroversial that patients with documented, complete,
bilateral hippocampal damage are amnesics, but don’t
confabulate, whereas, regardless of their lesion’s location,
confabulators all have a relatively preserved hippocampus, at
least unilaterally (Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002; Dalla Barba
and Boissé, 2010).
Accordingly, Dalla Barba and La Corte (2013) proposed a
model in which the hippocampus is the neural correlate of TC,
which is lost in hippocampal amnesia and malfunctioning in
confabulation.
According to the model they proposed, lesions occurring to
brain areas and pathways upstream or downstream an intact
or partially preserved hippocampus produce different types and
possibly different modality of appearance of confabulation. In
that model the hippocampus plays a passive role receiving
directly from upstream pathways, or indirectly, through
the cingulum and the retrosplenial cortex already distorted
information. The aim of the present work is to further develop
the previous model. In this new perspective, a partially damaged
hippocampus may still allow TC to exist, but may loose its
peculiarity of segregating and organizing information in the
temporo-parietal cortex (TPC).
In this article, we review data showing differences and
similarities among forms of confabulation. We then develop the
model sketched in our previous work (Dalla Barba and La Corte,
2013) showing that the hippocampus is crucial both for the
normal functioning of TC and as the generator of confabulations,
and that different types of confabulation can be traced back to a
distortion of TC resulting from damage or disconnection of brain
areas directly or indirectly connected to the hippocampus.
The model described in this work is a ‘‘neuro-
phenomenological’’ one, in the sense that it combines the
phenomenological description of confabulation and neurological
or neurocognitive experimental accounts of the issues treated in
this work.
Varieties of Confabulation: Differences and
Similarities
Differences in Etiology and Anatomy
Confabulation is a rather infrequent disorder with different
aetiologies and anatomical lesions. It is a pathognomonic sign
of Korsakoff’s syndrome (Korsakoff, 1889; Bonhoeffer, 1904;
Wyke and Warrington, 1960; Talland, 1961; Mercer et al.,
1977; Cermak et al., 1980; Dalla Barba et al., 1990; Benson
et al., 1996; Schnider et al., 1996a), but is observed also
in other pathological conditions, namely in patients suffering
from ruptured aneurism of the anterior communicating artery,
subarachnoid haemorrhage or encephalitis (Luria, 1976; Stuss
et al., 1978; Kapur and Coughlan, 1980; Alexander and
Freedman, 1984; Moscovitch, 1989, 1995; Delbecq-Derouesné
et al., 1990; DeLuca and Cicerone, 1991; Irle et al., 1992;
Kopelman et al., 1995; Papagno andMuggia, 1996; Schnider et al.,
1996b; Dalla Barba et al., 1997b; Diamond et al., 1997), head
injury (Weinstein and Lyerly, 1968; Baddeley and Wilson, 1986;
Dalla Barba, 1993b), Binswanger’s Encephalopathy (Dalla Barba,
1993a), Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and frontotemporal dementia
(Kern et al., 1992; Dalla Barba et al., 1999; Nedjam et al., 2000,
2004; Attali et al., 2009) and aphasia (Sandson et al., 1986). On
occasion, or in particular experimental conditions, confabulation
may also be observed in normal subjects (Kopelman, 1987;
Burgess and Shallice, 1996b; Dalla Barba et al., 2002).
At a general level, distinctions between types of confabulation
are considered to reflect different underlying brain lesions.
Anterior brain lesions, in particular in the OFC basal forebrain
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and related structures, have been consistently associated with
spontaneous confabulations (Kopelman, 1987; Moscovitch,
1995; Schnider et al., 1996a; Schnider and Ptak, 1999; Gilboa
et al., 2006b). Spontaneous confabulations, however, can
also occur with lesions not involving the OFC and related
structures (Dalla Barba, 1993a; Dalla Barba and Boissé, 2010;
La Corte et al., 2011). Other types of confabulation lack a
specific anatomical basis, but are usually related to posterior
cortical and subcortical lesions sparing the OFC and related
structures. Overall, lesions in more than 20 brain regions have
been reported in confabulation (Gabrieli et al., 1988; Gilboa and
Moscovitch, 2002; Dalla Barba and Boissé, 2010). Therefore,
unlike many other neuropsychogical disorders, e.g., aphasic
syndromes, confabulation is not associated with a specific
lesion site.
Similarities in Content
Regardless of their etiology and anatomy, most confabulations
are indistinguishable from true memories, in the sense that their
content is plausible, mostly consisting of habits, repeated events
or over-learned information mistakenly considered as specific
unique episodes, so that an observer blind to the patient’s past,
present and future situation wouldn’t be able to tell whether
the patient is confabulating or not (Dalla Barba, 1993a; Dalla
Barba et al., 1997b, 1999; Burgess and McNeil, 1999; La Corte
et al., 2010). The case of patient MG (Dalla Barba et al., 1997a)
well illustrates how confabulations can go undetected when
the real present and past situation of a patient is unknown.
While he was waiting to undergo a CT scan, MG told the
radiologist that he had accompanied a friend to be admitted
to the neurology department that day. The neurologist who
was taking care of MG’s (inexistent) friend realized that MG
also had neurological problems and so decided to refer him to
the radiology department for a CT scan. On that occasion the
radiologist did not even suspect that MG was confabulating.
Another example is the following:
– How did your disease begin? Asks the doctor to patient CA.
– It started with a strong sore throat . . . I couldn’t swallow
anything . . . so I couldn’t go to school . . . my mother called
the doctor, answers the patient.
– How did your disease begin? Asks the same doctor to another
patient, CD.
– It started with a strong headache . . . one morning I woke up
with a strong headache and then I started throwing up and I
remember I couldn’t keep my eyes open, answers the patient.
One of these two patients is confabulating, whereas the other
one is reporting the memory of an event she has really
experienced. As you can see, there is nothing in the patients’
reports that can help you to tell which patient is confabulating.
However, if we tell you that CA is a 67-year-old woman
with Korsakoff’s syndrome (Dalla Barba et al., 1990) and
that CD is a 33-year-old woman reporting the onset of her
Herpes meningitis, things become much more clear and these
additional pieces of information allow you to identify CA
as the confabulating patient. This is not because you know
that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome confabulate, but rather
because you know that it is quite unlikely that somebody
who is 67-year-old goes to school and has a mother who
calls the doctor for her sore throat. In addition you know
that headache, vomiting and photophobia are common in the
onset of Herpes meningitis, which suggests you that CD is
not confabulating. Nevertheless, CA’s and CD’s reports have
something in common. They are plausible (Dalla Barba, 1993a)
in the sense that an observer blind to the patient’s personal
past wouldn’t be able to tell whether the patient is confabulating
or not.
Temporal Similarities
However, the confabulators’ tendency to mistake habits and
repeated events as unique episodes encompasses not only their
personal past, but involves their personal present and future
as well. In fact, they often confabulate about their present
situation (Dalla Barba et al., 1990, 1998; Dalla Barba, 1993a;
Burgess and McNeil, 1999; La Corte et al., 2010, 2011) saying,
for example, that they are at school rather than at the hospital
(Dalla Barba et al., 1990), and make confabulating errors
concerning their personal future, saying, for example, that the
following day they will be going at work, although they are
not working anymore (Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Schnider,
2008; La Corte et al., 2011). Sometimes they also act upon
their confabulated present and future. Patient MB (Dalla Barba,
1993a), for example, on one occasion said that he was looking
forward to the end of the testing session because he had to
go to the general store to buy some new clothes, since he
hadn’t been able to the day before. On this occasion the patient
actually attempted to leave his hospital room, claiming that
there was a taxi waiting for him downstairs. The patient’s
tendency to confabulate in the three dimensions of personal
temporality—past, present and future—has been consistently
reported using the Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993a;
Dalla Barba and Decaix, 2009) in 20 patients with confabulatory
syndromes of various aetiologies and with different brain lesions
(Dalla Barba et al., 1997a,b; Dalla Barba and Boissé, 2010; La
Corte et al., 2010, 2011).
Anatomical Similarities
Regardless the lesions’ heterogeneity, confabulators have at
least partial preservation of the hippocampus (used here to
refer to the hippocampus proper together with the dentate
gyrus and the subicular cortex). In a review of 79 cases of
confabulation, it was found that none of these patients had
hippocampal lesions (Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002). Other
28 confabulators, not considered in the above review, also
had normal hippocampi (Dalla Barba et al., 1990, 1997b;
Dalla Barba, 1993a; Fotopoulou et al., 2004, 2007; Ciaramelli
et al., 2006; Ciaramelli and Ghetti, 2007). Damage to the
hippocampus has long been known to produce amnesia
(Scoville and Milner, 1957), i.e., a retrograde and anterograde
episodic memory deficit ‘‘out of all proportion to other
memory and cognitive functions in an otherwise alert and
responsive patient’’ (Victor et al., 1971). Episodic memory
dysfunction varies according to the degree of hippocampal
damage. In early AD, mild to moderate hippocampal atrophy
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induces mild to moderate episodic memory deficit. Episodic
memory is completely abolished following complete, bilateral
hippocampal damage. Amnesic patients show normal or close
to normal performance on a number of implicit learning
and memory tasks, have preserved linguistic skills and
have relatively preserved general knowledge or semantic
memory. In contrast, they are completely unable to learn
and retain any new information, show extensive retrograde
amnesia, and have no phenomenological experience of
remembering their personal past and of predicting their
personal future. In these patients, who are sometime described
as stucked in an instantaneous present, the three dimensions
of personal temporality, past, present and future, are lost.
They have no difficulties with physical or chronological time
(Husserl, 1893). They have preserved semantic knowledge
of units of time and their relationships (Tulving, 1985).
They have relatively preserved knowledge of past public
and historical events and they can predict episodes and
events in the public domain (Klein et al., 2002). But in
contrast with this preserved knowledge of physical and
impersonal time, their awareness of subjective time is severely
impaired. Accordingly, classic hippocampal amnesia cannot
be considered a pure episodic memory deficit, but rather a
pathological condition affecting individuals’ episodic subjective
temporality.
Within the framework of the Memory, Consciousness and
Temporality Theory (MCTT; Dalla Barba, 2002), it has been
proposed that confabulation reflects a distortion of TC, whereas
classic amnesia due to hippocampal damage reflects a loss of TC.
The Memory, Consciousness and
Temporality Theory (MCTT)
In line with the continental phenomenological tradition
(Brentano, 1874; Sartre, 1943; Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Husserl,
1950), the MCTT considers that consciousness is not an aspecific
entity, but is intentionally projected toward its object, being
always consciousness of something. Here and hereafter the object
of consciousness is not meant to be necessarily a physical object,
but it is what consciousness is addressing, a physical object,
e.g., a pen, or an abstract object, e.g., an event. Consciousness
addresses its object in different ways, implying that different
types, or modes of consciousness exist. For example, this pen
in front of me on the desk, I can perceive it, if I close my
eyes, I can imagine it, I can hate it or like it, I can know
it, e.g., know that is it is a pen and not a sailing boat, I
can remember it, e.g., remember where and when I bought it.
All these different relationships between consciousness and its
object are original, because each one differs from each other
and irreducible, because they are not the final result of a causal
or ontological cascade. The aim of this work is not to detail
a taxonomy of different types of consciousness, but to use
the distinction made by Dalla Barba (2002) between TC and
Knowing Consciousness (KC).
KC is defined as a specific form of consciousness allowing
individuals to be aware of past, present and future impersonal
knowledge and information. KC concerns, for example, knowing
that G. W. Bush was the past President of the United States,
that Obama is currently in charge of that position and that in
the next Presidential elections he will be not allowed to run
for a third term. KC is usually relatively preserved in both
confabulating and non confabulating amnesics (Dalla Barba
et al., 1997b; Klein et al., 2002; Dalla Barba and Boissé, 2010; La
Corte et al., 2010, 2011). Patients who have no phenomenological
experience of remembering their personal past and of predicting
their personal future not only are able to retrieve impersonal
past information, i.e., semantic memories, but are also able
to predict the impersonal future. For example, they have no
difficulties in answering questions like ‘‘What is likely to be
an important breakthrough in the medical domain in the next
10 years?’’ (Klein et al., 2002; La Corte et al., 2010, 2011).
They also have preserved ‘‘personal semantics’’, i.e., they have
access to personal past and present factual information. They
can correctly give, for example their date of birth and they
can tell that they went to school and then graduated. They can
also use this information to make inferences about their future.
Yet none of these cases do they have the phenomenological
experience of remembering specific episodes from their personal
past and of predicting specific episodes in their personal
future.
TC is a specific form of consciousness that allows individuals
to have phenomenological experience of remembering their
personal past, of being oriented in their present world and
of predicting their personal future (Dalla Barba and La
Corte, 2013). It is this type of consciousness that defines
individuals as temporal entities with a personal past, present
and future. Personal temporality, as expressed by TC, is
different from impersonal temporality, as expressed by KC.
Patients without TC, due to bilateral hippocampal damage
(see below) still have impersonal temporality, i.e., they can
access and use impersonal past, present and future information,
but they have lost the personal dimension of time. They can
learn and know things about their past, as they can know
things about their future. They can even learn their entire
biography (see below the description of patient RM), but
they have no phenomenological experience of remembering
their past and of projecting themselves in specific future
situations.
In normal conditions, TC addresses the object’s Uniqueness
(U), whereas KC addresses the object’ Multiplicity (M). Let’s
consider the following example. This pen on the desk reveals both
an U and a M, according to how my consciousness address it.
It represents a U if I consider it that-specific-pen-I-bought-last-
week-and-that-I-will-be-using-this-afternoon-to-sign-a-cheque. It
represents a M if I consider it an-indeterminate-pen-belonging-
to-the-category-of-pens. In short, U means this specific pen and
not another one, whereas M means a pen, an object belonging to
the multiplicity of objects of the same category. Accordingly to
how consciousness addresses its object, the pen in this example,
the object reveals a U, or a M. Anticipating what will be discussed
later on, in normal conditions, TC’s object represents U, whereas
KC’s object represents M.
In the next section, we will see how what we have discussed so
far is relevant to the interpretation of confabulation.
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Temporal Consciousness, Confabulation
and Amnesia
In confabulators, TC is present, but it is malfunctioning, because
these patients confabulate when questioned about their past,
present and future. Conversely, non-confabulating amnesics,
who have lost TC, have no phenomenological experience of
remembering their personal past and of predicting their personal
future. An increasing number of studies have addressed the
question of the neurocognitive relationship between episodic
memory and the individuals’ ability to predict their personal
future. What is referred to, as memory of the future (Ingvar,
1985), planning (Dalla Barba et al., 1997b) or imagining the
future (Klein et al., 2002; Schacter et al., 2007), mental time travel
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007) and chronesthesia (Tulving,
2002) are aspects of TC as described in the MCTT (Dalla
Barba, 2002). Schacter et al. (2007) propose that remembering
the past is necessary to imagine the future. However, although
remembering the past and imagine the future depend much on
the same neural machinery, namely the medial temporal lobe,
there is no ontological priority of remembering vs. predicting
the future. In other words remembering is not a prerequisite to
predict the future. It is not because I remember that I had a cup
of thee this morning that I am able to predict having sushi for
dinner tonight.
As reported elsewhere by Dalla Barba and co-workers (Dalla
Barba and Boissé, 2010; Dalla Barba and La Corte, 2013), aspects
of the MCTT relevant to the interpretation of confabulation and
amnesia are summarized below.
1. Events produce atemporal and aspecific patterns of
modifications in the brain. These modifications, are
atemporal in the sense that they do not contain any
information concerning time. They do not represent the past,
the present or the future, nor are they organized according
to the order of succession, i.e., there is nothing in Y, for
example, that tells that Y come before Z and after X. They
are aspecific in the sense that they do not contain any
information specifying that they are representing episodes,
meanings, rules, procedures, or algorithms.
2. The patterns of modifications in the brain can be more or less
stable and more or less vulnerable depending on a number
of variables. These variables include, among others, attention
at encoding, emotional value of the event, depth of encoding,
rehearsal and repeated experience of the same or of a similar
event.
3. TC is a specific form of consciousness that allows individuals
to have phenomenological experience of remembering their
personal past, of being oriented in their present world and of
predicting their personal future. It is specific because it cannot
be confounded with other forms of consciousness, such as,
for example, perception and imagination. If, for instance, the
average person perceives a tiger in front of them, they will be
scared, but if they remember or imagine such an event, they
may not be scared at all.
4. TC is experimentally measurable and dissociable from
impersonal temporality. Using the Confabulation Battery,
which includes 11 dependent variables (Dalla Barba, 1993a;
Dalla Barba and Decaix, 2009), it has been demonstrated that
confabulators and amnesics either confabulate or have no
phenomenological experience of remembering their personal
past and of predicting their personal future, whereas they
are able to answer questions about impersonal past, present,
and future (e.g., what happened to Princess Diana, who the
President of the United States is and what is likely to be one
of the most important breakthrough in the medical domain in
the next 10 years; La Corte et al., 2011; Klein et al., 2002).
5. TC is lost in amnesia following complete bilateral
hippocampal damage and malfunctioning in confabulation,
because it receives distorted information from more than 20
damaged, predominantly orbitofrontal, brain areas.
6. The object of consciousness represents a determination and
an indeterminateness, what we have called U and M. U refers
to unique events, whereas M refers to repeated events. TC
addresses the object’s U, whereas KC addresses its M.
In normal conditions, TC interacts with less stable patterns of
modification of the brain in order to seize the object’s U, past,
present or future, whereas KC, interacts withmore stable patterns
of modification of the brain in order to seize the object’s M. The
interaction between TC and less stable patterns of modification
of the brain allows individuals to identify the ‘‘pen’’ as a U, i.e., as
an object belonging to a personal temporality—I have used this
pen yesterday to sign a cheque, it is now in front of me, just some
inches beside the computer’s keyboard, and I can predict using
it tomorrow to sign another cheque for the plumber. In contrast,
the interaction of KC with more stable patterns of modification
of the brain allows people to identify the ‘‘pen’’ as a M, i.e., as a
specific object, which is different from other objects—this pen in
front of me is different from the computer’s keyboard, although
they share similar functions.
In amnesia TC is lost. Non-confabulating amnesic patients
don’t have any phenomenological experience of remembering
or of predicting specific unique events in their personal past
or personal future. They can recognize elements of their life as
familiar, but this, in the framework of the present theory, does
not reflect uniqueness. They can say: ‘‘this is my dog, my mother,
my car, my house’’, but they don’t have any phenomenological
experience of remembering or of predicting any specific unique
episode concerning their dog, mother, car or house. In other
words, since they have lost TC, they have lost the possibility of
segregating specific episodic information within a network of
information, which is the necessary condition to access objects’
uniqueness (see below).
In confabulation, TC is still present, but it is not interacting
with less stable patterns of modification of the brain, because
these modifications are abolished or inaccessible in the mode of
TC. In this condition, TC interacts with more stable patterns
of modifications of the brain, and the result is that repeated
events, habits and over-learned informations, in short the
object’s multiplicity, are seized as unique events, past, present or
future. It is clinically well known, for instance, that hospitalized
confabulators, when directly questioned on what they have done
the previous day, usually report routine activities from their
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life before the accident. For example, they may say that the
previous day they went to work or that they had dinner at
home ‘‘as usual’’. In this case, irretrievable episodic memories,
i.e., events that occurred in a unique and specific temporo-
spatial context, are replaced by routines, i.e., multiple, repeated
events that didn’t occur in a unique and specific temporo-
spatial context. Therefore we can say that M, i.e., routines and
repeated events, is mistaken for U, i.e., a specific unique event
that occurred in a specific, unique temporo-spatial context (such
as the previous day). This clinically well known observation has
been experimentally demonstrated for the first time in a recent
work from the Dalla Barba’s group (Serra et al., 2014). In order to
measure the ability to discriminate unique from repeated events
the authors used four runs of a recognition memory task, in
which some items were seen only once at study, whereas others
were seen four times. Confabulators, but not non-confabulating
amnesics, considered repeated items as unique, thus mistakingM
for U. The authors suggested that a crucial mechanism involved
in the production of confabulations is thus the confusion between
unique and repeated events.
It might be argued that this account may explain Habits
Confabulations, but not other types of plausible confabulations,
which do not necessarily arise from the patient’s own life.
The example of patient MG and the radiologist described earlier
in this paper reports a plausible confabulation, but there is no
evidence that the patient ever went visiting a friend admitted to
a neurology department. However, Habits Confabulations, the
most common form, and other types of plausible confabulation
may rely on very similar mechanisms involving the hippocampus
ability to segregate and organize information in the temporo-
parietal associative cortex. In the Dalla Barba and La Corte
(2013) model the hippocampus played a sort of ‘‘passive’’ role.
It passively received distorted information directly from the TPC
or indirectly, through the cingulum, and ‘‘temporalized’’ them in
a personal temporal framework. The result of this condition is
that the hippocampus produces confabulation because it receives
distorted information from upstream or downstream from other
brain areas it is connected with. In the Dalla Barba and La
Corte (2013) model, the hippocampus is a brain structure that
receives distorted information and locates them in a personal
temporal framework. However, it is known and accepted (e.g.,
Hardt et al., 2013) that the hippocampus has also an active role.
It acts as a sort of ‘‘pointer’’, making a fine-grained search in
the neocortex segregating specific episodic information within
a network of information, which is not (necessarily) pertinent
to the goal, i.e., the retrieval of specific episodic memories. If
the hippocampus is partially damaged, it may select plausible
information based on the patient’s habits. However, if plausible
habits are unavailable, or do not fit the current demands, it
may make an ‘‘abductive inference’’ (Coltheart et al., 2010),
providing the best plausible explanation of the patient’s current
situation.
In the La Corte et al. (2010) study ‘‘bizarre’’, ‘‘implausible’’,
‘‘fantastic’’, ‘‘semantically anomalous’’ confabulations, either
spontaneous or provoked represented less than 5% of the
total number of confabulations. The model proposed here
accounts for this type of confabulation. Lesions upstream the
hippocampus may produce deep semantic deficits, which may
produce ‘‘semantically anomalous’’ confabulation (Dalla Barba,
1993b), i.e., confabulations with semantically incoherent content.
Lesions downstream the hippocampus, in particular in the
OFC may produce ‘‘fantastic’’ or ‘‘bizarre’’ confabulations. It is
well known that patients with orbitofrontal lesions often show
inadequate and bizarre behavior. This type of behavior may
extend to the memory domain and to the domain of TC in
general.
In contrast to confabulation, in amnesia, due to complete
hippocampal damage, TC is lost. Patients with classical amnesia
are unable to temporalize objects. They can’t remember their
past, they are disoriented in the present world and they are
unable to prospect their future. Since in these patients TC is
lost, no interaction is possible between TC and more or less
stable patterns of modification of the brain. In contrast, in these
patients, KC is relatively preserved and interacts normally with
more stable patterns of modification of the brain. Therefore
they can access and use impersonal information concerning the
past, the present and the future. They can say, for example, that
Kennedy was killed, that France is a republic, whereas UK is a
kingdom, and that the candidate for the Democrats in the next
US Presidential elections will not be Barack Obama.
Neural Correlates of Temporal
Consciousness
So far we have seen that what distinguishes confabulators from
non-confabulating amnesics is a distorted TC, in the first, and
a loss of TC, in the latter. We have also seen that available data
indicate that the integrity, at least partial or unilateral, of the
hippocampus seems to be a necessary condition in order for
individuals to confabulate, whereas its complete damage not only
is not associated with confabulation, but results in a loss of TC,
and consequently in deep amnesia.
It is known that some patients with bilateral lesions in
the hippocampus confabulate. Patients with limbic encephalitis
(Kikuchi et al., 1999; Nahum et al., 2010; Kartsounis and de Silva,
2011) and Pick’s disease with hippocampal involvement (Kremen
et al., 2010), for example, confabulate. But limbic encephalitis
and Pick’s disease don’t lead to complete, bilateral hippocampal
destruction. In the Nahum et al. (2010) study, inflammation
was pronounced in the left hippocampus, but was only mild in
the right one. In the Kremen et al. (2010) study, it is clearly
stated that the hippocampus was relatively spared bilaterally.
One case is reported to have complete limbic lobe destruction
and confabulation (Gascon and Gilles, 1973). However, in
this patient complete, bilateral hippocampal damage is not
documented. Overall, there is overwhelming evidence supporting
the conclusion that at least partially preserved hippocampus is a
necessary condition for confabulation.
At variance with patients with hippocampal amnesia, patients
with diencephalic amnesia have distorted TC, as defined in
this and previous work from Dalla Barba and co-workers.
Confabulation, which is the hallmark of a distorted TC, is a
pathognomonic sign of Korsakoff’s syndrome (Korsakoff, 1889;
Bonhoeffer, 1904; Wyke and Warrington, 1960; Talland, 1961;
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Mercer et al., 1977; Cermak et al., 1980; Dalla Barba et al.,
1990; Benson et al., 1996; Schnider et al., 1996a; Borsutzky
et al., 2008), which is a diencephalic amnesia. Patients with non-
Korsakoff thalamic lesions (e.g., Gentilini et al., 1987; Hodges and
McCarthy, 1993; Markowitsch et al., 1993; Markowitsch, 2008)
and patients with orbitofrontal lesions (e.g., Kopelman, 1987;
Knight et al., 1995;Moscovitch, 1995; Schnider et al., 1996a; Dalla
Barba et al., 1997b; Schnider and Ptak, 1999; Gilboa et al., 2006b)
show deep anterograde, more variably, retrograde amnesia and,
invariably, various types of memory distortions, i.e., distorted
TC, including confabulations.
Taken together, these observations show that hippocampal
amnesia, complete bilateral destruction of the hippocampus,
produces negative signs and symptoms, i.e., the failure to retrieve
the desired information in TC, whereas non-hippocampal
amnesia, diencephalic and frontal, produce positive signs such as
memory distortions. This strongly suggests that the hippocampus
is the neural correlate of TC (Dalla Barba and La Corte,
2013) and is supported by an increasing number of recent
neuropsychological (Klein et al., 2002; Hassabis et al., 2007;
Rosenbaum et al., 2007; Kwan et al., 2010) and neuroimaging
(Martin, 2001; Schacter and Addis, 2007; Botzung et al., 2008;
Addis et al., 2011) studies confirming that the hippocampus is a
core structure within a network involved in individuals’ temporal
existence, i.e., their having phenomenological experience of a
personal past, present and future.
Hippocampal anatomy, physiology and connectivity are
all suggestive of a crucial function of this neural structure
in associating experienced events in order to remember
specific episodes from one’s own past and to adapt to
ongoing and future reality (Henke, 2010). The hippocampus
is reciprocally connected, either directly or indirectly, with all
neocortical association areas. It receives upstream, through
the parahippocampal, perirhinal, and entorhinal cortices,
projections from unimodal and polymodal neocortical
association areas and projects downstream, through the
fornix, to the hypothalamus, the anterior thalamus, the anterior
cingulate gyrus and the OFC. Lesions to the fornix result in
amnesia without confabulation, whereas confabulation has been
described for lesions involving all the above neural structures,
but sparing the hippocampus.
If the hippocampus is the neural correlate of TC, then its
function is to temporalize information. This doesn’t mean that
the hippocampus has a subjective intentional life, likemonitoring
theories assume for the, anthropomorphised, frontal lobe (see
Dalla Barba, 2002 for a discussion of the homunculus fallacy and
the anthropomorphisation of the brain), but that information,
normal or distorted, assumes a personal, temporal dimension
when processed by the hippocampus. In normal conditions,
the hippocampus accomplishes its function very well, being
able to capture the events’ uniqueness—that specific walk I had
yesterday afternoon along the Bastille Canal and not the walk I
take each day there, or the conference I will give tomorrow at
5 pm and not a general talk I will be giving in the future. It is now
well known that the hippocampus is crucial for rapid, single-trial
learning of flexibly integrated what-where-when information
(Henke, 2010). Consistently, it has been shown that long-term
potentiation following a single train of high-frequency tetanic
stimulation can be induced in the hippocampus (Trepel and
Racine, 1998). Thus, the normal function of the hippocampus
is to temporalize unique phenomenological experiences. This
function is the result of the interaction between the hippocampus
and less stable patterns of modification in neocortical unimodal
and polymodal association areas.
As we have seen, in keeping with some aspects of the MCTT,
these patterns of modification of the neocortical association areas
are atemporal and aspecific. They are atemporal because they
do not represent the past, the present or the future. They are
aspecific because they do not contain any information specifying
that they are representing episodes, meanings, rules, procedures,
or algorithms. These patterns of modifications of the neocortical
areas are made temporal and specific by the hippocampus,
which processes them as temporal and specific. The patterns of
modification that events produce in the neocortical areas can
be expressed in behavior atemporally and aspecifically, like, for
example, in priming effects. In priming effect, single, unique
past events influence current performance and behavior without
being temporalized, i.e., they are not expressed as elements of
a personal past, present or future. This is known since the
pioneering clinical reports by Korsakoff, Claparède and others.
So, at present, the hippocampus is the best candidate as the
neural correlate of TC, although it is involved in other functions,
like reaction to novelty, single trial learning and ‘‘unconscious’’
episodic memory (Henke, 2010).
Hippocampus Confabulation and Amnesia
In its classical form, confabulation is observed for lesions in the
mammillary bodies and the dorsomedial thalamic nucleus. It is
well known that confabulation is frequently observed following
lesions in the OFC and basal forebrain. These uncontroversial
observations lead researchers to consider lesions to these neural
structures as crucial for confabulation to occur. However, as
mentioned above, confabulations are observed for lesions in
more than 20 anterior and posterior cortical and subcortical
areas, which are all directly or indirectly connected to the medial
temporal lobe and to the hippocampus. The OFC is one of
these structures to which the hippocampus projects through the
fornix, mammillary bodies and TH. Lesions to the mammillary
bodies and the TH, but also to the basal forebrain produce
confabulations (Schnider, 2008). In short, with the exception of
lesions involving the fornix, damage at any point of the pathways
running downstream the hippocampus produce confabulation,
provided that the hippocampus is, at least partially, preserved.
If the hippocampus is severely damaged bilaterally the result is
deep amnesia without confabulation (Dalla Barba and La Corte,
2013).
Brain damage involving areas projecting from upstream
to a preserved hippocampus are also known to produce
confabulation (Dalla Barba, 1993a,b; De Anna et al., 2008;
Attali et al., 2009). As stated elsewhere (Dalla Barba and La
Corte, 2013), lesions to temporoparietal association areas,
or to their projections to the hippocampus, may produce
confabulated memories and plans, which may differ in
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content from confabulations observed from lesions involving
the OFC, or structures and pathways downstream of the
hippocampus. Lesions downstream of the hippocampus produce
semantically appropriate confabulations, either provoked or
spontaneous. Lesions upstream of the hippocampal circuit
produce more implausible and semantically anomalous
confabulations. Therefore, the hippocampus is likely to
be the core temporal device that temporalizes personal
phenomenological experiences, provided either directly by
temporoparietal association areas, or, indirectly, through
the Papez’s circuit, by diencephalic, basal forebrain and
orbitofrontal structures. Lesions upstream or downstream
sparing the hippocampus may all produce confabulation. This
model is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1A depicts the normal functioning of the circuit.
Figure 1B shows a complete bilateral damage to the medial
temporal lobe and the hippocampus with the consequent
loss of TC resulting in deep amnesia. Figure 1C describes
lesions to temporo parietal areas or their disconnection
to the hippocampus, resulting in semantically anomalous
confabulations. Figure 1D shows lesions downstream of the
hippocampal circuit producing the most common form of
confabulation, which are mainly plausible, semantically coherent
and indistinguishable from true memories, unless one is aware of
the patient’s past, present and future situation.
The anatomical basis of confabulation has been a puzzling
issue. Confabulation was originally described in alcoholic
patients (Korsakoff, 1889), later shown to have diencephalic
lesions (Victor et al., 1971), but were then observed in patients
with chronic infections, traumatic brain lesions, subarachnoid
hemorrhage, brain tumors and other pathologies (for a review,
see Schnider, 2008). Overall, more than 20 anterior and posterior
brain lesion loci have been associated with confabulation (Gilboa
et al., 2006a,b; Dalla Barba and Boissé, 2010). Confabulations are
also a common finding in diffuse brain pathologies like AD and
frontotemporal dementia. Therefore, it seems uncontroversial
that confabulation lacks a specific neurobiological correlate,
either in terms of pathology, or in terms of lesion’s location.
Here, we propose that the neural correlate of confabulation is
the, at least partial, integrity of the hippocampus in association
with lesions in brain areas that project, directly or indirectly
to the hippocampus. Lesions upstream or downstream of the
hippocampus may produce different types of confabulation
through the disruption of different cognitive processes, but at
least a partial integrity of the hippocampus is the necessary
condition for confabulation to occur.
As far as the involvement in confabulation of specific
regions within the hippocampus is concerned, at present no
reliable data are available and consequently, no conclusion
is possible. However, it is reasonable to think that CA3
and the posterior hippocampus may be crucial for the
normal functioning of TC. Neuroimaging data in normal
subjects as well as animal studies show that various long-axis
specialisations arise out of differences between the anterior and
posterior hippocampus (Poppenk et al., 2013). The anterior
hippocampus is involved in coarse, global representations,
whereas the posterior hippocampus is involved in fine-grained
local representations. CA3 is known to be involved in pattern
separation and pattern completion (Rolls, 2013; Deuker et al.,
2014). Furthermore, CA3, compared to entorhinal cortex (EC),
subiculum, CA1-CA2, is relatively preserved in early AD
(Mueller et al., 2007, 2010), a condition in which confabulations
are present (Dalla Barba et al., 1999; De Anna et al., 2008;
Attali et al., 2009). Fine-grained local representations, pattern
separation and pattern completion are processes possibly
involved in TC’s recognition of uniqueness (see above). If these
processes are disrupted, then multiplicity may be mistaken
for uniqueness, because interfering, distorted information from
other damaged brain areas or other hippocampal subfields
prevents the normal functioning of the posterior hippocampus
and CA3, and consequently, of TC. Further research evaluating
the role of specific hippocampal subfields in confabulation
will provide possible support to what, at present, is mere
speculation.
Comparison with other Models of Memory
and Confabulation and Guidelines to the
Falsification of the Model
TC, as used here and in other works from the Dalla Barba’s
group, is distinct from other types of consciousness, namely
KC, Imaginative Consciousness and Perceiving Consciousness
(Dalla Barba, 2002). TC is the synthesis of a set of theoretical
assumptions, have some specific characteristics and is one of the
core concepts of the MCTT (Dalla Barba, 2002). To summarize,
TC is:
– the prediction of a concrete personal phenomenon,
i.e., individuals’ ability to consciously remember their
past, to be consciously oriented in their present world and to
consciously predict their personal future;
– experimentally measurable: questions like ‘‘Do you remember
what you had for dinner last night, the last time you went to the
restaurant, the last time you went for a swim?’’, or ‘‘Can you
predict when you will be going to the restaurant, for a swim
next time?’’ aremeasures of TC. The possibility to answer these
questions relies on the integrity of TC, and amnesics typically
either answer ‘‘I don’t know’’ or confabulate to these questions.
– neurobiologically grounded in a specific neural structure, the
hippocampus;
– lost in hippocampal amnesia and malfunctioning in
confabulation, because it receives distorted information
from more than 20 damaged, predominantly orbitofrontal
areas.
Some authors have used the term TC in a loose and unspecified
sense, not referring to what TC is in Dalla Barba’ formulation.
This caused to some misunderstanding. In a recent work,
for example, Craver et al. (2014, p. 192) argued that La
Corte et al. (2011) and Dalla Barba and La Corte’s (2013)
concept of TC is ambiguous, because in their definition TC
‘‘comprises many cognitive faculties, including many that are
preserved in people with severe deficit in episodic memory and
future thought.’’ TC definition was probably not sufficiently
clear in Dalla Barba and La Corte (2013). In the MCTT
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FIGURE 1 | Adapted with permission from Dalla Barba and La Corte
(2013). A schematic cognitive and neuroanatomical model of normal and
pathological functioning of memory and Temporal Consciousness (TC).
(A) Normal functioning of memory and TC: the hippocampus, which is the
neural correlate of TC, temporalizes information received directly from the TPC,
or indirectly from the OFC and the TH, through the cingulate gyrus, allowing
individuals to remember their personal past, to be oriented in their present and
to predict their personal future. (B) Amnesia: complete, bilateral lesions to the
hippocampus abolish TC, preventing individuals from accessing their personal
temporality (i.e., their past, present, and future). (C) Implausible or semantically
anomalous confabulation: lesions to the TPC provide the hippocampus with
distorted semantic information, inducing the hippocampus and TC to make
semantically anomalous confabulatory errors concerning the individual’s
personal temporality. (D) Plausible, or semantically appropriate confabulation:
lesions to the TH and the OFC provide the hippocampus with plausible but
erroneous information, inducing the hippocampus and TC to make plausible
confabulatory errors concerning the individuals’ personal temporality.
Abbreviations: TPC, temporo-parietal cortex; PHG, parahippocampal gyrus;
PRC, perirhinal cortex; EC, entorhinal cortex; Hip, hippocampus; TH, thalamus;
OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; TC: temporal consciousness.
(Dalla Barba, 2002) and in other works from Dalla Barba’s
group, TC is meant to refer to individuals’ phenomenological
experience of remembering their past, of being present to
their present world, and to predict episodes in their future.
Craver et al. (2014, p. 192) say that ‘‘If TC is defined simply
as the ability to remember past personal experiences and to
episodically imagine future personal experiences, then KC—the
well-know amnesic patient they describe in their work—lacks
TC.’’ Dalla Barba and co-worker’s definition of TC refer exactly
to this ability and not to the ability, which is preserved
in amnesics, to access information concerning personal past,
present and future. Craver et al. (2014) argue that episodic
amnesia can spare many aspects of TC. KC had preserved
semantic knowledge of time, he had little or no difficulties
with physical, or chronological time and preserved order of
succession judgement. In other words, KC had good knowledge
of time:
‘‘KC consciously understands the past, present and future, is aware
of the fact that he has a past, present and future, and appreciates the
implications of an event’s being in the past, present or future (such
as the temporal asymmetry of causation and the irrevocability of
the past). If KC is trapped in the present, he is trapped there with
an awareness of his past, present and future, that is, with temporal
consciousness’’ (Craver et al., 2014, p. 193).
Here and throughout their work the authors mistake KC
(see above) for TC. An individual can be conscious of time,
without having TC. KC allows individuals to know many
things about personal time, to be aware that they have
a past and a future, to arrange personal episodes along
a timeline, to have attitudes about time, to make value
judgements involving time, to know what regret is and to
anticipate it. These operations are spared in KC, i.e., KC
(and personal semantics, see above) is preserved. Yet none
of these operations of KC grants the possibility of having
the phenomenological experience of remembering their past,
of being present to their present world, and of predicting
episodes in their personal future, because these, according to
the MCTT, are operations of TC, which is exactly what KC
lacks. Knowledge of autobiographical facts, the ability to order
autobiographical events on a timeline are preserved in most
amnesics, but, as far as they lack phenomenological experience
of remembering, they are not included in Dalla Barba’s concept
of TC. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved either in
the mode of TC, i.e., with the phenomenological experience
of remembering a specific personal past episode, or in the
mode of KC, without the phenomenological experience of
remembering a specific personal past episode. All KC’s time-
related spared abilities that Craver and colleagues attribute to
aspects of TC are indeed aspects of KC (Dalla Barba, 2002).
Patient RM, for example, was a young girl suffering from
isolated retrograde amnesia, who had detailed knowledge of
her autobiography, but who didn’t have any phenomenological
recollective experience of the episodes she could retrieve in the
mode of KC (Dalla Barba et al., 1997c). This is an example of
how autobiographical episodes can be retrieved in the mode
of KC.
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These apparent criticisms have forced us to recognize that
our characterization of the phenomenon was imprecise and
encompassed a wide range of temporal competencies that, in fact,
are preserved in episodic amnesia.
Now, the next question is, to what extent the ideas described
so far are compatible with existing theories on memory and
confabulation?
A number of hypotheses have been proposed to account for
confabulation.
The gap-filling account traditionally considers confabulation
a more or less intentional desire to fill gaps in memory to
avoid embarrassment (Bonhoeffer, 1904; Pick, 1905; Bleuler,
1949). This hypothesis has been disconfirmed by data showing
that patients do not confabulate in any domain in which
their memory is faulty or when they are asked to answer
questions for which they have a mandatory gap in memory
and for which both non-confabulating amnesics and normal
subjects the ‘‘normal’’ response is ‘‘I don’t Know’’ (‘‘What did
you do on March 13, 1985?’’, or ‘‘Who was the President
of Mexico in 1975?’’ (Dalla Barba, 1993a; Dalla Barba et al.,
1997b; Dalla Barba and Decaix, 2009; Schnider et al., 1996a). A
related hypothesis is the one initially proposed by Conway and
Tacchi (1996) and later developed by Fotopoulou et al. (2004,
2007), which states that confabulations are often motivated,
guided by a wishful thinking, in order to embellish the
patient’s current situation. An argument in favor of this idea
has been that confabulations often have a positive emotional
content. Motivation and positive content of confabulation
certainly occur in some cases and is not incompatible with the
ideas we propose here. However, confabulations with negative,
dark content have also been reported (Dalla Barba et al.,
1998).
The executive dysfunction hypothesis has also been proposed
to explain confabulation (Stuss et al., 1978; Kapur and Coughlan,
1980; Moscovitch and Melo, 1997). However, it has been shown
that an executive/frontal dysfunction is neither necessary, nor
sufficient for confabulation to occur (Dalla Barba et al., 1990,
1997a, 1999; Delbecq-Derouesné et al., 1990; Dalla Barba, 1993a).
Another group of theories proposes that confabulation is the
result of a failure of monitoring processes. These theories hold
that in confabulation processes involved in the evocation and
verification of memories are impaired (Moscovitch, 1989, 1995;
Johnson, 1991; Burgess and Shallice, 1996b; Moscovitch and
Melo, 1997; Gilboa et al., 2006a; Schnider, 2008).
According to Johnson et al. (1997) confabulation reflects poor
source monitoring, or reality monitoring, i.e., deciding whether a
memory is a trace of something that actually happened to you, or
is a memory of an imagined event. Impaired reality monitoring
due to frontal damage would result in confabulation. However, it
has been shown that reality monitoring was equally disrupted in
a confabulatory patient and in non-confabulating patients with
frontal lobe damage (Johnson et al., 1997). Accordingly, a reality
monitoring deficit may occur with confabulation but is not the
only factor involved in the genesis of confabulation (Johnson
et al., 1997).
According to Moscovitch and colleagues (Moscovitch, 1989,
1995; Moscovitch and Melo, 1997; Gilboa et al., 2006a)
confabulation results from the disruption of strategic retrieval, a
monitoring, effortful, self-initiated cognitive process. If strategic
retrieval is impaired due to orbitofrontal damage, memories are
retrieved associatively, i.e., automatically, so that the first idea
that comes to mind is accepted as a true memory, although it
is actually a confabulation. A similar account of confabulation is
proposed by other models (e.g., Burgess and Shallice, 1996a).
Within the group of monitoring theories of confabulation,
Schnider and colleagues have proposed that confabulation is
due to reality confusion resulting from a deficit of reality
filtering following lesions to the posterior OFC (Brodman’s
area 13) or structures directly connected with it (Schnider
and Ptak, 1999; Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002). According to
Schnider and colleagues, reality filtering describes a memory
control process necessary to maintain thinking and behavior in
phase with reality (Schnider, 2008). It depends on orbitofrontal
area 13 and connected subcortical structures, is electrocortically
expressed at 200–300 ms after evocation of a memory and
is under dopaminergic modulation. They further argue that
reality filtering can be traced back to extinction capacity,
i.e., the ability to learn when previously valid anticipations
no longer apply to current reality and behavior needs to be
adapted (Nahum et al., 2010, 2011). A problem concerning
this model, is the claim that filtering (monitoring) of evoked
memories occurs at 200–300 ms. In our view it is quite
difficult to understand how a memory, for example ‘‘Last
night I had dinner at the restaurant’’, can be verified and
subsequently accepted or rejected in such a short time.
An additional problem is that Schnider’s and colleagues
experiments on confabulation are run in a time window of
minutes (up to 30 min), whereas patients confabulate for
episodes that occurred well beyond Schnider’s and colleagues
experimental time setting. Accordingly, it is questionable
whether their experimental reduction can really be informative
on the neurobiological and cognitive mechanisms underlying
confabulation.
Taken together, theories that emphasize the disruption of
monitoring/filtering processes in the origin of confabulation
attribute to the frontal lobe, namely to the OFC, the role of
searching and evaluating memories and information in the
hippocampus and in the TPC. However, it is not specified
on what theoretical basis the OFC would operate the search
and evaluation of memory and information in the posterior
part of the brain. In these theories the frontal cortex is
assumed to have a subjective intentional life. Dalla Barba has
indicated this as ‘‘the fallacy of the homunculus’’ (Dalla Barba,
2001, 2002), that is the idea that an unconscious subject, an
homunculus, makes a selection between true and false memories
and provide consciousness only with true memories. It is
well known that patients with orbitofrontal lesions suffer from
disinhibition, which involves not only memory, but the patient’s
entire behavior. Therefore it is reasonable to think that a
disrupted OFC and related structures, provide the hippocampus,
through the Papez circuit, with already distorted information
that are temporalized as true memories and informations.
This interpretation is more economical in that it avoids the
involvement of strategic retrieval and monitoring processes,
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which, at the state of the art, need to be more firmly theoretically
grounded.
To summarize, the model described in this work is:
1. Compatible with current knowledge about functions and
specialization of the human hippocampus. In particular,
pattern separation and completion (e.g., Rolls, 2013; Deuker
et al., 2014) and fine-grained local representations (e.g.,
Poppenk et al., 2013) may well be properties expressed in TC.
2. Internally coherent and theoretically grounded, without the
need to postulate the existence of unconscious explanatory
idols (Dalla Barba, 2009) like monitoring theories do.
3. Powerful in that it accounts in neurocognitive terms for
amnesias and different forms of confabulation.
Unlike models which, being based on unconscious explanatory
idols, are impermeable to scientific investigation, the account
proposed here is scientifically falsifiable. Specifically, the present
model will be disconfirmed if converging evidence will show
that:
1. Patients with complete bilateral hippocampal damage are able
to answer questions tapping TC. Questions like: ‘‘Do you
remember what you had for dinner last night, the last time you
went to the restaurant, the last time you went for a swim?’’, or
‘‘Can you predict when you will be going to the restaurant, for
a swim next time?’’
2. Patients with complete bilateral hippocampal destruction
confabulate.
3. Patients who are amnesic for their personal past have
phenomenological experience of their future.
4. Patients who confabulate in remembering their personal
past do not confabulate when having phenomenological
experience of their future.
Until converging counterevidence disconfirming the model will
be provided, this, together with its central assumptions, should
be considered a valuable account of existing knowledge and
information concerning normal and pathological memory and
its neurobiological bases.
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